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Gordon and Li (2010) adapts the Tiebout framework to the institutional setting of China to model 
the decisions of its local governments. The model generates rich and important predictions, which 
are broadly consistent with the stylized facts of China. The Gordon-Li framework makes it 
possible to systematically analyze a number of economic phenomena in China, and to diagnose 
and improve the efficiency of the fiscal system. 
 
Below I first summarize the major features of the paper. I then discuss competing theories and the 




In the Gordon-Li model, local officials share the objective of the governments they serve, which is 
to maximize the local fiscal revenue net of the cost of public services. The model accommodates 
rich and realistic sources of local fiscal revenues and items of expenditure. This facilitates 
analyzing distortions in the resource allocation between agricultural and non-agricultural 
production, and between capital-intensive and labor-intensive industries. The model has important 
implications for the efficiency of the tax system. For example, the analysis supports replacing the 
production-based VAT in China with a consumption-based VAT. Another important source of 
efficiency loss explicitly analyzed in the paper is the different objective functions, due to taxes, of 
state-owned and non-state-owned firms. 
 
Even with its realistic features, however, the model is highly simplified. Except for the fiscal 
revenue, other incentives for local officials are not considered. For example, the model does not 
include the promotion incentive provided by upper-level governments, which may be relevant (Xu, 
2010). Moreover, the model assumes that tax rates are exogenous even though the effective rates 
may be endogenous: local governments can affect the actual tax rates through various preferential 
tax schemes, such as establishing special industrial zones. In addition, in the Gordon-Li model 
prices are exogenously set. Although endogenizing prices may not affect the static analysis of 
allocation efficiency, it could affect the implications of a tax reform. 
 
Despite the potential complications due to the omitted factors, the predictions of the Gordon-Li 
model fit well with a number of stylized facts about China. Table 1 summarizes the major 
predictions of the model. Some of the predictions have been suggested by earlier research, but 
some are original. For example, the model implies that regional governments have an incentive to 
convert less land from agricultural to industrial or residential use than they should. As a result, 
land prices are high in the urban and low in the rural areas. 
 
 Alternative models 
 
Can other models of regional government generate similar predictions as in the Gordon-Li 
framework? Possible. An example of this is a model in which the decision of local government 
officials is affected by the central government. The central government may impose a list of 
“targets” for local governments to achieve (Tsui and Wang, 2004). To motivate local government 
officials to fulfill those targets, the central government may introduce certain rewards, such as the 
promotion of officials based on their performance. Xu (2010) formalizes how a promotion scheme 
can provide incentives for local officials. Aware of this influence of the central government, in 
section 4 the authors extensively discuss its implications that are different from those by the 
Gordon-Li model. Here, in addition, I would like to draw readers' attention to similar predictions 
of the different models. For example, as the list of “targets” typically includes fiscal revenue, this 
target system can motivate local officials to behave as if they are maximizing tax revenue. 
 
The policy implications of the two models may differ. The behavior of local government officials 
would be more sensitive to the change of the central-local relationship under the promotion 
incentive than under the revenue-maximizing incentive. Moreover, the efficiency implications 
may also differ by model. Hence, it is important to be able to determine whether it is the centrally 
provided incentives or the local governments’ own incentives that have been the main driving 
force of their behavior. 
 
In addition, corruption revenues may also be a relevant incentive for officials. For example, the 
Gordon-Li model predicts that local governments may convert less agricultural land to urban use 
because local officials stay in position for limited periods. Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests 
that local officials have a strong incentive to convert farm land to industrial and residential use. 
This might occur because the private benefits to local officials, e.g. bribery, from the land 
conversion dominate the incentive to maximize local fiscal revenue. 
 
Suggested further tests 
 
Given the rich predictions of the Gordon-Li model, it is possible to test its relevance by testing its 
unique predictions. One possible way to do so is to identify major tax reforms and test their 
impacts as predicted by the Gordon-Li model. A key condition of this test is that at the same time 
as the tax reform, there should not be a major change in the central-local relationship or the target 
system to avoid their confounding effects. 
 
To illustrate, consider a prediction of the Gordon-Li model as follows. The 1994 tax reform would 
change the incentive for local governments to invest in agriculture: low investment before the 
reform and high investment afterwards. Since the target responsibility system evolved gradually 
for the mid-1980s and became fully developed by 1995, one would need to identify some regions 
in which the target system developed early and changed little around 1994. The agricultural 
investment in these regions can then be investigated to test whether it significantly increased after 
the tax reform, as the Gordon-Li model implies. 
 Other comments 
 
One assumption required in the Gordon-Li model to achieve efficient outcomes is that regional 
public investments do not have spillover effects on other regions. This might be violated, for 
example, in the case of transport infrastructure investment. In a recent study, Li and Li (2010) find 
that the highway investment in China has a strong effect on the inventory holding of firms in 
neighboring provinces. In this case, the choices that are efficient for regional governments may 
not be efficient nation-wide. 
 
In comparing stylized facts about China to model predictions, the authors typically use national 
aggregates. On several occasions, it would be more consistent with theory to present more 
disaggregated information. For example, Figure 1 in the paper shows the variation of investment 
in agriculture over time. As the Gordon-Li model focuses on the behavior of regional governments, 
a more relevant diagram would show the investment by local governments. It is important to 
distinguish between investment by the regional and central governments because the fiscal ability 
of the central government also changed significantly due to the 1994 tax reform. Separating the 
investment by the regional and central governments may thus reduce the confounding effects of 
the changing fiscal capacity of the central government. 
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 Table 1 Predictions of Gordon-Li model and their empirical relevance 
Predictions Empirical 
relevance 
1.  Local governments force state-owned firms to increase 
employment. 
Consistent 
2.  Local governments allocate less credit and land to private firms 
than to government owned firms. 
Consistent 
3.  Over-investment in industry as compared to agriculture. 
Consistent 
4.  Local governments convert less land from agricultural to industrial 
or residential use than they should, thus keeping land prices high 
in the urban and low in the rural areas. 
Unavailable 
5.  Local governments over-supply infrastructure that benefits 
industries but under-supply public goods that benefit agricultural 
production. 
Consistent 
6.  Local governments have inadequate incentives to supply public 
services or to implement regulatory policies that benefit local 
private firms. 
Consistent 
7.  Local governments may use local protectionism to intervene in 
inter-regional trade. 
Consistent 
8.  More capital-intensive regions are more likely to provide hukou to 
skilled labor. 
Unavailable 
Note: Empirical relevance here simply means that the stylized facts of China are consistent with the 
model predictions. The predictions have not been rigorously tested. 
 
 